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oncerns about adverse events, 
including deaths, in recent large 
clinical trials, both publicly and 
privately sponsored, prompted Elias A. 
Zerhouni, Director, National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) to convene a meeting 
at the NIH on January 11–12, 2005, to 
discuss “Moving from Observational 
Studies to Clinical Trials: Why Do We 
Sometimes Get It Wrong?” (a detailed 
summary and video archive of the 
meeting are available at http:⁄⁄www.
meetinglink.org/omar/ct/index.htm). 
“It is time for an ‘M and M’ [Morbidity 
and Mortality] conference [on medical 
evidence],” Zerhouni said at the 
meeting. He challenged attendees to 
develop innovative ideas to aid decision 
and policy making, commenting that 
the credibility of the scientiﬁ  c enterprise 
was at stake. “Forty percent of science 
news relates to health or medicine,” 
he noted, “and we are seeing a gradual 
erosion of public trust.” 
    Experts in trial design and analysis 
reviewed sources of error that can 
affect clinical investigations from 
early observational studies to Phase 3 
clinical trials. Speakers provided telling 
examples of biased observational 
data leading to unnecessary clinical 
trials, poor trial design and analysis, 
and misleading communication of 
results. Participants also proposed ways 
to maximize the quality of evidence 
available and considered the impact of 
the “-omics” revolution on the design 
of future clinical trials. Ample time 
was allowed for discussion, allowing 
the authors, who constituted the 
Planning Committee, to generate the 
recommendations (listed in Box 1) that 
serve as the organizational framework 
for this article. 
    Recommendation 1: Be Aware 
of and Eliminate Bias and 
Confounders, to the Extent 
Possible
    Among the most recent and notable 
clinical trials that called prior 
observational evidence into question 
was the NIH Women’s Health Initiative 
clinical trial of combined estrogen 
and progestin hormone replacement 
therapy (HRT). In July 2002, the NIH 
halted the trial because statistical 
analysis indicated evidence of increased 
risk of breast cancer, heart disease, 
and stroke among postmenopausal 
women taking the combined estrogen–
progestin regimen [1,2]. In this case, 
conventional wisdom, based primarily 
on observational studies, so strongly 
supported the view that HRT would 
lower (rather than increase) the risk 
of heart disease, stroke, and dementia 
in postmenopausal women, as well 
as prevent hip fracture, that critics 
protested that NIH was wasting money 
on a Phase 3 clinical trial—or worse, 
that the trial was unethical because 
half the women would not receive the 
“known beneﬁ  ts” of HRT. But many at 
the meeting (for one example, see [3]) 
commented that there was selection 
bias in the observational studies. The 
women who were taking HRT in those 
studies were fundamentally different 
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  Box 1. Recommendations 
Arising from the Meeting
    •  Be aware of and eliminate bias and 
confounders to the extent possible.
    •  Establish formal means of setting 
priorities for conducting large clinical 
trials.
    •  Employ meta-analyses and systematic 
reviews to enhance means of weighing 
evidence, but beware of potential 
systematic biases.
    •  Give equal weight to determining 
safety and efﬁ  cacy in clinical trials.
    •  Validate biomarkers and surrogate end 
points before basing policy guidelines 
for public health on them.
    •  Employ the technologies of the 
“-omics” revolution and systems 
biology approaches, but with caution.
    •  Communicate results of clinical trials in 
an accurate and timely manner.
  •  Establish  two-way  communications 
with communities, consumers, and 
patient advocacy groups during 
development, implementation, and 
reporting of clinical trials.
    •  Establish criteria to inform public 
policy and decision making. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0757
from those enrolled in this trial; they 
were generally leaner, less likely to 
smoke, better educated, more likely 
to exercise, and more likely to seek 
medical care than those who did not 
take HRT. Moreover, when the United 
States Preventive Services Task Force 
(an independent panel funded by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality) conducted a systematic review 
of HRT studies, it found “insufﬁ  cient 
evidence” to support long-term use of 
HRT for chronic disease prevention 
[4]. (Following the results of the 
Women’s Health Initiative trial, the 
panel recommended against use of 
combined HRT for the prevention of 
chronic disease.)
    Many of these same issues of bias 
and confounders arose in “M and M” 
reviews of other clinical evidence. 
Based on reports that people eating 
foods rich in beta-carotene had lower 
risks of cancer, and the assumption 
that it was the antioxidant effects of 
the beta-carotene or of carotenoids in 
general that were responsible, at least 
four randomized clinical trials were 
conducted in the US and abroad [5–8]. 
Overall, the trials showed no beneﬁ  t 
of beta-carotene in well-nourished 
populations, while some studies actually 
showed increased risk of lung cancer 
incidence and mortality in smokers 
exposed to the nutrient. 
    The beta-carotene trials overturned 
powerful intuitions about the role 
of speciﬁ  c nutrients in cancer 
prevention. Workshop participants also 
voiced concern about unwarranted 
assumptions that could lead to delays in 
conducting a trial. This was the case for 
beta-blockers, which for over a decade 
were not prescribed in cases of chronic 
heart failure because it was assumed 
that the drug’s actions in lowering 
blood pressure and slowing heart rate 
would worsen heart failure. In fact, the 
drugs are beneﬁ  cial. They have now 
been proven in randomized controlled 
trials to decrease mortality in patients 
who suffer chronic heart failure [9–13]. 
  Recommendation  2:  Establish 
Formal Means of Setting Priorities 
for Conducting Large Clinical Trials
    Uncovering confounders and being on 
guard against conventional “wisdom” 
can help “get future trials right,” but 
that still leaves open the question of 
whether to conduct a trial in the ﬁ  rst 
place. The goal of a clinical trial is 
to beneﬁ  t public health, usually by 
testing an intervention to reduce the 
morbidity or mortality of a disease. But 
it is clear that other priorities affect 
decision making—such as those listed 
in Box 2. 
    The strength of existing evidence 
is the most obvious and logical basis 
for the decision to launch a clinical 
trial. There is general agreement that 
the well-designed, large randomized 
double-blind and placebo-controlled 
trial is at the top of a hierarchical 
ladder of evidence in relation to 
the assessment of the effects of 
interventions. It is followed, in order 
of diminishing strength, by evidence 
from smaller randomized controlled 
trials, uncontrolled trials, observational 
studies, case studies, and, at the 
bottom, logical constructs (opinion) 
and anecdotes [14]. Whatever evidence 
exists at any level in the hierarchy 
needs to be weighed in the process of 
decision making. 
    However, this analysis of the 
literature may also involve other 
considerations, such as the level of 
risk compared with potential beneﬁ  t, 
whether side effects are minor or 
major, the cost or feasibility of the 
intervention, and so on. The result 
is that ultimate decision and policy 
making may not always be completely 
logical, consistent, and transparent. 
These worrisome issues triggered 
considerable discussion at the meeting 
and inspired further recommendations.
    Recommendation 3: Employ Meta-
Analyses and Systematic Reviews 
to Enhance Means of Weighing 
Evidence, but Beware of Potential 
Systematic Biases
    The two formal tools most commonly 
used today to obtain an accurate 
overview of the literature are meta-
analyses and systematic reviews. Meta-
analyses are a means of obtaining 
greater statistical power and precision 
for data analysis by combining 
results from smaller clinical trials or 
studies into a summary statistic as 
long as the data meet the analysts’ 
selection criteria and the studies 
allow for comparability. Systematic 
reviews have been pioneered by 
such organizations as the Cochrane 
Collaboration (http:⁄⁄www.cochrane.
org), the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (http:⁄⁄www.
ahrg.gov), and its US Preventive 
Services Task Force (http:⁄⁄www.
ahrg.gov.clinic/uspstf/ﬁ  x.htm), 
and it is suggested that systematic 
reviews be employed in the design 
and interpretation of all clinical trials 
[15,16]. For each systematic review, 
the reviewers develop a set of criteria 
and grade the strength of each study 
selected for review. The individual 
grades in the aggregate determine 
the overall level of evidence: e.g., 
strong, weak, insufﬁ  cient. Even using 
these more objective approaches, 
however, there is a danger that biases 
can inﬂ  uence the review. To deal 
with bias and inconsistencies across 
grading systems, an international 
GRADE Working Group (http:⁄⁄www.
GradeWorkingGroup.org) has 
developed a system that explicitly 
states the factors and methods used in 
making judgments [17].
    And while one would hope that 
consistent results of multiple meta-
analyses of smaller randomized studies 
would be conﬁ  rmed in large clinical 
trials, data from a dozen large (more 
than 1,000 individuals) randomized 
clinical trials showed that 35% of the 
time, the outcomes were not predicted 
accurately by previously published 
meta-analyses [18]. Even outcomes 
of megatrials themselves on the same 
topic are not always consistent. In one 
  Box 2. Factors Affecting the 
Decision to Conduct a Clinical 
Trial
    •  Strength of existing evidence: 
promising, but not conclusive data 
from pre-clinical and observational 
studies/small trials
    •  Potential impact on public health 
and/or medical science 
  •  Therapeutic  equipoise:  difﬁ  culty 
deciding which of two therapies is 
better without a head-to-head test
    •  Portfolio balance: a research 
organization may adjust its priorities 
to give more (or less) attention to 
speciﬁ  c areas to achieve optimal use 
of its resources
    •   A potential for runaway practice, e.g., 
a new diagnostic test that is being 
widely marketed, but has not been 
adequately evaluated
  •  Social/political  context/pressures—
from legislators, community leaders, 
patient advocacy groups 
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study of pairs of large trials on the 
same topic, the results of 79 out of the 
289 pairs (27%) differed in statistically 
signiﬁ  cant ways [19].
    Recommendation 4: Give Equal 
Weight to Determining Safety 
and Efﬁ  cacy in Clinical Trials
    In September 2004, Merck 
(Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, 
United States of America) withdrew its 
cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor rofecoxib 
(Vioxx) from the market because 
clinical trials showed increased risk of 
heart disease and stroke among long-
term users of the pain drug [20,21]. 
Concerns about rofecoxib and other 
cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitors led an 
expert committee convened by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
to recommend that the Pﬁ  zer (New 
York, New York, United States of 
America) drugs celecoxib (Celebrex) 
and valdecoxib (Bextra) remain 
on the market, but no longer be 
advertised directly to consumers, and 
carry stringent “black box” warning 
labels about cardiovascular risks [22]. 
The FDA subsequently asked Pﬁ  zer 
to withdraw Bextra from the market 
[23]. In another instance of safety 
precautions, the FDA issued an advisory 
in October 2004 stating that selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor drugs 
used to treat depression may pose a 
suicide risk in adolescents [24].
    Safety is a growing concern today, 
insofar as many clinical trials aim at 
preventing disease or forestalling 
disease progression and late-stage 
complications in people with chronic 
diseases. Because such trials often 
require large sample sizes and long 
follow-up to achieve deﬁ  nitive health 
outcomes, there is sometimes pressure 
to use surrogate (intermediate) 
end points to decrease trial size and 
duration. The results of a clinical 
trial of limited duration in relatively 
healthy adults can then translate to a 
recommendation for lifetime use of a 
drug (e.g., statins, antihypertensives) 
for an individual who may be older 
and less ﬁ  t than the trial participants. 
Concerns about the risks of the 
lifetime use of drugs led many meeting 
participants to propose (1) longer 
trials, or at least longer-term follow-up, 
(2) empowering the FDA to conduct 
better postmarketing surveillance, and 
(3) broadly disseminating information 
on adverse events. 
  Recommendation  5:  Validate 
Biomarkers and Surrogate End 
Points before Basing Policy 
Guidelines for Public Health 
on Them
    The shift in patterns of disease from 
acute infections to the chronic 
degenerative diseases affecting older 
populations has expanded the market 
for drugs. It has also created a growth 
industry in biomarkers, since the latter 
have the potential to allow for smaller 
trials of shortened duration. Broadly 
deﬁ  ned, a biomarker is “a characteristic 
that is objectively measured and 
evaluated as an indicator of normal 
biological processes, pathogenic 
processes, or pharmacological 
responses to a therapeutic 
intervention” (as deﬁ  ned at the 1999 
NIH/FDA conference “Biomarkers 
and Surrogate End Points: Advancing 
Clinical Research and Applications” 
and stated in [25]).
  Screening  Tests
    A biomarker associated with a risk for 
disease is a candidate for a screening 
test. A case in point is the prostate-
speciﬁ  c antigen (PSA). Tests showing 
high serum PSA values in men with 
prostate cancer drove clinical decisions 
for biopsy and subsequent medical or 
surgical treatment. But did the men 
beneﬁ  t? The question remains open, 
but the harms are inescapable.
      The Prostate Cancer Prevention 
Trial.   This randomized placebo-
controlled clinical trial enrolled nearly 
19,000 men, 55 or over, with PSA levels 
of 3 ng/ml or under [26]. The men 
in the trial were treated with the 5-
alpha reductase inhibitor ﬁ  nasteride, 
which lowers testosterone levels, or a 
placebo, and treatment was followed 
with periodic PSA tests and digital 
rectal exams for seven years. All were 
offered biopsy at the trial’s end. The 
prevalence of prostate cancer in the 
ﬁ  nasteride group was 18.4%, compared 
with 24.4% in the placebo group (  p   < 
0.001). However, more than half of the 
men found with cancer in the placebo 
group had had a normal PSA and 
digital rectal examination throughout 
the trial. In a follow-up study of men 
in the placebo group, investigators 
concluded that there is no cutpoint 
of PSA such that higher scores are 
strongly associated with higher risk for 
clinically important prostate cancer 
and lower scores with lower risk; there 
are too many false positives and false 
negatives at every score [27].
    The PSA test provides some 
important object lessons. It can detect 
a broad spectrum of prostate cancers. 
However, prostate cancers are a 
heterogeneous group—ranging from 
rapidly progressing and aggressive to 
slowly progressive or nonprogressive. 
Treating the last group may lead to 
the erroneous conclusion that these 
patients were “cured” by screening 
and treatment. If unscreened and 
untreated, these same men might 
simply have gone on to die from other 
causes—at the same point in time. Early 
diagnosis based on screening may also 
lead to the erroneous assumption that 
screening increases true survival time, 
since survival is measured from the 
time of diagnosis—longer in the case of 
the screening diagnosis compared with 
the time when the patient becomes 
symptomatic (the “lead time” bias). 
  Surrogate  (Intermediate)  End 
Points
    Biomarkers can also serve as 
“surrogate” or “intermediate” end 
points, instead of true health or 
clinical outcomes (how the patient 
feels or functions, or whether he or 
she survives). The virtue of a surrogate 
end point is that it provides a window 
at an intermediate point   t   in the trial, 
short of the true health or clinical 
outcome, and can serve as a bellwether 
that indicates whether treatment   x   is 
working or not, thus saving both time 
and money. But that depends on the 
validity of the surrogate. And validity 
is not easy to establish, as this example 
illustrates.
      Diabetes Control and Complications 
Trial.   Diabetic retinopathy with 
severe visual impairment or blindness 
is one of the long-term sequelae of 
diabetes. The Diabetes Control and 
Complications Trial was a randomized 
multicenter trial of 1,441 patients 
with diabetes to determine if intense 
monitoring of glucose and the use of 
an insulin pump would reduce the risk 
of retinopathy, inter alia [28]. The 
development of microaneurysms was 
chosen as a surrogate marker, since 
they are associated with vision loss. 
Early trends indicated an increase in 
microaneurysms and could have led to 
premature termination of the trial. But 
longer-term follow-up showed deﬁ  nite 
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reduction in visual impairment, and 
the trial was appropriately ended at 
that point since it demonstrated a 
health beneﬁ  t. 
    Similar cautionary tales can be told 
about the use of surrogates in other 
trials. A trial comparing continuous 
oxygen therapy with nocturnal 
oxygen only in patients with chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease used 
a number of surrogate markers (e.g., 
hematocrit, cardiac index, pulmonary 
vascular resistance) to monitor effects 
and seemingly indicated no deleterious 
effects of the nighttime-only regimen. 
Nevertheless, the patients with 
continuous oxygen therapy had lower 
mortality than the group on the 
nocturnal regimen only [29].
    Recognizing their potential value, 
several methods for the validation 
of biomarkers and surrogates were 
proposed at the meeting. One entails 
the use of hazard rates. The hazard 
rate is the risk of an event (such as 
death) at a given point in time in a 
clinical trial and can be computed for 
the experimental and control groups 
in the trial. The hazard rate for the 
experimental group divided by the 
hazard rate for the controls deﬁ  nes the 
“hazard ratio.” If this fraction is greater 
than one, the chances of succumbing to 
the health risk (such as death) increase 
with the treatment; if the ratio is less 
than one, the chances of the health 
risk decrease with treatment. The 
hazard rate framework could be used 
to establish, at the strongest, a causal 
link between a surrogate and the true 
clinical or health end point (essentially 
establishing that the surrogate captures 
or mediates the relationship between 
the treatment and the true end point), 
or less stringently, a strong association 
[30]. Also strengthening the case 
for validity would be corroborative 
ﬁ  ndings from meta-analyses of smaller 
trials of a surrogate in relation to a 
given therapy. Other tests of validity 
for biomarkers invoke statistical 
measurements indicating that the 
marker demonstrates high sensitivity 
and speciﬁ  city or has high predictive 
value, in an independent test sample 
[31].
    To validate surrogate end points, a 
“validity” trial in which both surrogate 
and true end points are observed 
should be conducted, one in which it 
can be concluded that the inferences 
about the intervention were the same, 
whether based only on the surrogate or 
only on the true end point.
    Recommendation 6: Employ the 
Technologies of the “-Omics” 
Revolution and Systems Biology 
Approaches, but with Caution
    The 21st century is seeing the growth of 
research on risk factors for disease and 
increased public interest in “wellness” 
and disease prevention. The tools for 
this research are the new technologies 
and databases of the “-omics” 
revolution: genomics, proteomics, 
metabolomics. The use of microarray 
technologies to determine patterns 
of genes activated in cells affected by 
disease compared with those in normal 
cells is a case in point—an exciting 
tool, yes, but one to be used with care, 
given the tendency to ﬁ  nd patterns 
where none exist [32,33]. Concerns 
about the credibility of positive ﬁ  ndings 
in “-omics” searches have led some 
statisticians to propose a rethinking of 
such venerable measures of signiﬁ  cance 
as   p   < 0.05 and to consider reﬁ  nements 
in data analysis to guard against false 
positive results [34].
  Recommendation  7:  Communicate 
Results of Clinical Trials in an 
Accurate and Timely Manner
    The results of clinical trials are of 
little beneﬁ  t to the public, patients, 
practitioners, or policy makers unless 
they are reported clearly and in a 
timely fashion. Some sponsors are 
reluctant to publish negative or adverse 
ﬁ  ndings [35]—as are some peer-
reviewed journals, leading to a skewing 
of the literature—although there 
are signs that this may be changing. 
Recently, a number of major medical 
journals have agreed to publish articles 
on clinical trials only if they have been 
previously registered in an accessible 
database. (The Uniform Requirements 
established by the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors 
stipulate that as of September 2005 
participating journals will consider for 
publication only those clinical trials 
that have been properly registered with 
a publicly available registry. See the 
Web site: http:⁄⁄www.icmje.org.) 
    In any case, what is said sometimes 
reveals a spin on data to favor a 
particular point of view. Results of a 
new therapy may be stated in terms of 
a relative percent improvement—but 
a percent of what? The base rate (the 
number of clinical events or the event 
rate) is often not stated. Reporting 
a relative percent improvement 
often exaggerates apparent beneﬁ  ts 
compared with reporting absolute rates 
with (versus without) the intervention.
    Examples of such misleading 
“data framing” presented at the 
meeting included an ad for an anti-
osteoporosis drug that claimed that 
individuals taking the drug in a year’s 
trial experienced a 68% reduction 
in clinical vertebral fractures over 
a comparable group on placebo. 
However, a look at the actual ﬁ  gures 
(see sidebar) showed that there were 
ﬁ  ve fewer fractures per 1,000 women 
among the drug users—leaving a far 
different impression of the magnitude 
of beneﬁ  t. Framing can be particularly 
misleading when beneﬁ  ts are reported 
as relative risks and harms are reported 
as absolute risks.
    Peer-reviewed articles may also 
be misleading. A paper in a leading 
medical journal reporting on a 
population-based case-control study of 
breast cancer stated that women who 
used aspirin over a ﬁ  ve-year period 
had a 20% reduction in breast cancer 
[36]. Here the 20% represents the 
relative risk, derived by dividing the 
1.6% risk of breast cancer reported 
for women who took aspirin by the 
2.0% risk of breast cancer in women 
not taking aspirin and subtracting the 
fraction from one: 1 − (1.6%/2.0%) 
  Presenting Relative Risks Alone 
Can Be Misleading
    “… a 68% reduction!”
    This ad for an antiosteoporosis drug 
claimed that individuals taking the 
drug in a year’s trial experienced a 68% 
reduction in clinical vertebral fractures 
over a comparable group on placebo. 
    What were the actual ﬁ  gures? The 
rate of fractures among placebo users 
was 0.738%. The rate of fractures among 
the drug users was 0.238%. Thus, the 
absolute risk reduction was 0.738% − 
0.238% = 0.5%, which translates to ﬁ  ve 
fewer fractures per 1,000 women—hardly 
headline news. But by presenting 
the data in terms of relative risk 
reduction—relative risk reduction = 1 − 
0.238%/0.738% = 0.678 (approximately 
68%)—the impressive 68% ﬁ  gure was 
advertised. Computations of relative risk 
reduction will always appear impressively 
large when actual event rates are low. 
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= 1 − 0.8 = 0.2 = 20%. (Since then, a 
large randomized placebo-controlled 
trial has shown no beneﬁ  t of aspirin on 
breast cancer incidence [37].) 
    The “take-home message” from these 
examples is to search for the meaning 
of the data behind the headlines—and 
for investigators to report more useful 
statistics, such as basic information on 
event rates and the use of absolute rates 
[38]. In this regard, the work of the 
CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of 
Reporting Trials) group in developing 
a checklist and ﬂ  ow diagram to 
improve the quality of reports on 
randomized clinical trials is highly 
commendable (see http:⁄⁄www.consort-
statement.org).
  Recommendation  8:  Establish 
Two-Way Communications with 
Communities, Consumers, and 
Patient Advocacy Groups in 
Developing, Implementing, 
and Reporting Clinical Trials
    That message is taken very seriously 
by two other groups of key players in 
communicating the results of clinical 
trials: reporters and patient advocacy 
groups. The best reporters do much 
more than act as passive conveyors of 
news releases about scientiﬁ  c ﬁ  ndings; 
they serve as “honest brokers” of the 
evidence and provide context for new 
ﬁ  ndings. 
    Patient advocacy groups play a 
different role from journalists, since 
they have an interest in promoting 
research and communicating results. 
Noteworthy among such groups has 
been the AIDS activist organization, 
Act Up. A representative of the 
group offered a cautionary tale about 
surrogate end points. To speed up the 
development of AIDS drugs in the early 
1990s, some advocates urged use of 
an increase in CD4 T cell counts as a 
surrogate for efﬁ  cacy in clinical trials—
which, in the case of dideoxyinosine, 
was a mistake. Changes in the CD4 
counts did not always accurately predict 
health outcomes and survival. 
  Recommendation  9:  Establish 
Criteria to Inform Public Policy 
and Decision Making
    Given the potential lifesaving or life-
enhancing beneﬁ  ts of a clinical trial, 
formal steps are needed to move 
outcomes and information into public 
health policy and decision making. 
Transparency and consistency in 
the process are key elements. For 
government-sponsored trials, the 
agency sponsoring the trial bears 
the responsibility for the timely 
(1) publication of ﬁ  ndings, (2) 
communication to the public and 
health professionals, and (3) provision 
of information to the Secretary, Health 
and Human Services, and the heads 
of other public health agencies as 
appropriate. Of course, responsibility 
for application to public health policy 
rests with elected representatives of the 
public. 
    Conclusion: Prospects for the 
Future
    In spite of the shortcomings in 
observational studies that have led 
to mistakes in the interpretation 
or application of evidence, there 
was an overall air of optimism at 
the meeting that taming the new 
technologies and applying strategies 
for rigorous statistical and study 
design may help resolve some of the 
uncertainties that bedevil clinical 
trials today. Greater knowledge of 
pharmacogenetics and metabolomics, 
and a better understanding of how 
genes interact with each other and 
with environmental variables, may 
lead to new designs for clinical trials. 
Medicine may see an acceleration of 
the movement toward prevention of 
disease and maintenance of health and 
well-being. All this will be welcome 
news to the public, advocacy groups, 
the media, policy makers—and 
scientists themselves, who are among 
the ﬁ  rst to admit, as Aristotle said, that 
“the investigation of truth is in one way 
hard, in another, easy.”   
  References
    1.  National Institutes of Health (2002 July 9) 
NHLBI stops trial of estrogen plus progestin 
due to increased breast cancer risk, lack 
of overall beneﬁ  t [news release]. Bethesda 
(Maryland): National Institutes of Health. 
Available: http:⁄⁄www.nhlbi.nih.gov/new/
press/02-07-09.htm. Accessed 13 February 
2006.
    2.  Rossouw JE, Anderson GL, Prentice RL, LaCroix 
AZ, Kooperberg C, et al. (2002) Risks and 
beneﬁ  ts of estrogen plus progestin in healthy 
postmenopausal women: Principal results from 
the Women’s Health Initiative randomized 
controlled trial. JAMA 288: 321–333. 
    3.  Barrett-Connor E (2004) Commentary: 
Observation versus intervention—What’s 
different? Int J Epidemiol 33: 457–459.
    4.  US Preventive Services Task Force (2002) 
Chemoprevention for hormone replacement 
therapy. Rockville (Maryland): US Preventive 
Services Task Force. Available: http:⁄⁄www.
ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstf/uspspmho.htm. 
Accessed 18 February 2006.
    5.  Hennekens CH, Buring JE, Manson JE, 
Stampfer M, Rosner B, et al. (1996) Lack of 
effect of long-term supplementation with 
beta carotene on the incidence of malignant 
neoplasms and cardiovascular disease. N Engl J 
Med 334: 1145–1149.
    6.  The Alpha-Tocopherol Beta Carotene Cancer 
Prevention Study Group (1994) The effect of 
vitamin E and beta carotene on the incidence 
of lung cancer and other cancers in male 
smokers. N Engl J Med 330: 1029–1035.
    7.  Omenn GS, Goodman GE, Thornquist MD, 
Balmes J, Cullen MR, et al. (1996) Effects of a 
combination of beta carotene and vitamin A on 
lung cancer and cardiovascular disease. N Engl 
J Med 334: 1150–1155.
    8.  Blot WJ, Li JY, Taylor PR, Guo W, Dawsey 
S, et al. (1993) Nutrition intervention trials 
in Linxian, China: Supplementation with 
speciﬁ  c vitamin/mineral combinations, cancer 
incidence, and disease-speciﬁ  c mortality in 
the general population. J Natl Cancer Inst 85: 
1483–1492.
    9.  Packer M, Bristow MR, Cohn JN, Colluci 
WS, Fowler MB, et al. (1996) The effect 
of carvedilol on morbidity and mortality 
in patients with chronic heart failure. U.S. 
Carvedilol Heart Failure Study Group. N Engl J 
Med 334: 1349–1355.
    10. Australia/New Zealand Heart Failure 
Research Collaborative Group (1997) 
Randomized, placebo-controlled trial 
of carvedilol in patients with congestive 
heart failure due to ischaemic heart 
disease. Lancet 349: 375–380.
    11. CIBIS-II Investigators and Committees (1999) 
The cardiac insufﬁ  ciency bisoprolol study II 
(CIBIS-II); A randomized trial. Lancet 353: 
9–13.
    12. Hjalmarson A, Goldstein S, Fagerberg B, 
Wedel H, Waagstein F, et al. (2000) Effects 
of controlled-release metoprolol on total 
mortality, hospitalizations, and well-being in 
patients with heart failure: The Metoprolol 
CR/XL randomized intervention trial in 
congestive heart failure (MERIT-HF). MERIT-
HF Study Group. JAMA 283: 1295–1302.
    13. CIBIS Investigators and Committees (1994) 
A randomized trial of beta-blockade in heart 
failure. The cardiac insufﬁ  ciency bisoprolol 
study (CIBIS). CIBIS investigators and 
committees. Circulation 90: 1765–1773.
    14. Barton S (2000) Which clinical studies provide 
the best evidence? BMJ 321: 255–256.
    15. Clarke M (2004) Doing new research? Don’t 
forget the old. PLoS Med 1: e35. DOI: 10.1371/
journal.pmed.0010035
    16. Young C, Horton R (2005) Putting clinical 
trials into context. Lancet 366: 107–108.
    17. GRADE Working Group (2004) Grading 
quality of evidence and strength of 
recommendations. BMJ 328: 1490. 
    18. LeLorier J, Gregoire G, Benhaddad A, 
Lapierre J, Derderian F (1997) Discrepancies 
between meta-analyses and subsequent large 
randomized, controlled trials. N Engl J Med 
337: 536–542.
    19. Furukawa TA, Streiner DL, Hori S (2000) 
Discrepancies among megatrials. J Clin 
Epidemiol 53: 1103–1109.
    20. [No authors listed] (2004 September 30) 
Merck announces voluntary worldwide 
withdrawal of VIOXX. Available: http:⁄⁄www.
merck.com/newsroom/vioxx_withdrawal/
pdf/vioxx_press_release_ﬁ  nal.pdf. Accessed 17 
February 2006.
    21. Eisenberg RS (2005 31 March) Learning the 
value of drugs—Is rofecoxib a regulatory 
success story? N Engl J Med 352: 1285–1287.
    22. [Anonymous] (2005 February 19) FDA panel 
opens door for return of Vioxx. Washington 
Post; Sect A: 1.
    23. FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(2005 April 7) FDA announces important 
changes and additional warnings for COX-
June 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 6  |  e144PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0761
2 selective and non-selective non-steroidal 
anti-inﬂ  ammatory drugs (NSAIDs). Rockville 
(Maryland): FDA Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research. Available: http:⁄⁄www.fda.gov/
cder/drug/advisory/COX2.htm. Accessed 13 
February 2006.
    24. Food and Drug Administration (2004 October 
15) Suicidality in children and adolescents 
being treated with antidepressant medications. 
A public health advisory. Rockville 
(Maryland): Food and Drug Administration. 
Available: http:⁄⁄www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
antidepressants/SSRIPHA200410.htm. 
Accessed 8 January 2006.
    25. Lipp E (2005 May 15) Cutting through the 
biomarker hype. Genet Eng News 25: 1,14,16.
    26. Thompson IM, Goodman PJ, Tangen CM, et 
al. (2003) The inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  nasteride on the 
development of prostate cancer. N Engl J Med 
349: 213–122.
    27. Thompson IM, Ankerst DP, Chi C, Lucia 
MS, Goodman PJ, et al. (2005) Operating 
characteristics of prostate-speciﬁ  c antigen in 
men with an initial PSA level of 3.0 ng/ml or 
lower. JAMA 294: 66–70.
    28. The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial 
Research Group (1993) The effect of intensive 
treatment of diabetes on the development 
and progression of long-term complications in 
insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus. N Engl J 
Med 329: 977–986.
    29. Nocturnal Oxygen Therapy Trial Group (1980) 
Continuous or nocturnal oxygen therapy in 
hypoxemic chronic obstructive lung disease: A 
clinical trial. Ann Intern Med 93: 391–398.
    30. Prentice RL (1989) Surrogate end points 
in clinical trials: Deﬁ  nition and operational 
criteria. Stat Med 8: 431–440.
    31. Baker SG, Kramer BS, Prorok PC (2004) 
Development tracks for cancer prevention 
markers. Dis Markers 20: 97–102.
    32. Ransohoff DF (2005) Bias as a threat to the 
validity of cancer molecular-marker research. 
Nat Rev Cancer 5: 142–149.
    33. Ransohoff DF (2005) Lesson from controversy: 
Ovarian cancer screening and serum 
proteomics. J Natl Cancer Inst 97: 315–319.
    34. Wacholder S, Chanock S, Garcia-Closas M, 
El Ghormli L, Rothman N (2004 March 17) 
Assessing the probability that a positive report is 
false: An approach for molecular epidemiology 
studies. J Natl Cancer Inst 96: 434–442.
    35. Chan AW, Hrobjartsson A, Haahr MT, 
Gotzsche PC, Altman DG (2004) Empirical 
evidence for selective reporting of outcomes 
in randomized trials: Comparisons of 
protocols to published articles. JAMA 291: 
2457–2465.
    36. Woloshin S, Schwartz LM (2004) Association of 
aspirin use and hormone receptor status with 
breast cancer risk. JAMA 292: 1426–1427.
    37. Cook NR, Lee IM, Gaziano JM, Gordon D, 
Ridker PM, et al. (2005 July 6) Low-dose 
aspirin in the primary prevention of cancer: 
The Women’s Health Study: A randomized 
controlled trial. JAMA 294: 47–55.
    38. Schwartz L, Woloshin S (2004) The media 
matter: A call for straightforward medical 
reporting. Ann Intern Med 140: 226–228. 
June 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 6  |  e144